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Abstract 
 
Microfinance has been on the development agenda for more than 30 years, heralded 
as the wondrous tool that reduces poverty and empowers women (Hulme and 
Mosley, 1996; Rutherford, 2001; Morduch and Haley, 2002; Khandker, 1998). 
Doubts, however, have recently been raised about the success of microfinance 
(Dichter and Harper, 2007; Banerjee et al, 2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2009; 
Karlan and Zinman, 2009; Bateman and Chang, 2009).  
Given this context, this paper re-examines the microfinance impact evaluation of 
SEWA Bank conducted by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) in India in 1998 and 2000. The USAID panel and a new cross-section data 
set are analysed using propensity score matching (PSM) and panel data techniques 
to address selection bias. Sensitivity analysis of the matching results is used to 
explore their reliability. Various sub-group comparisons between borrowers, savers 
and controls are also conducted to shed some light on the impact of savings versus 
credit.  
The paper concludes that doubts remain about the quality of the impact estimates 
obtained through advanced econometric techniques. Direct observation and the 
outcome of sensitivity analysis of the PSM analysis suggest that the application of 
PSM and differences-in-differences (DID) to these observational data were probably 
unable to account for selection on unobservables1
 
.  
Key words: Impact evaluation, evaluation methods, selection bias, microfinance, 
India 
 
Forthcoming in T. Nair (ed.) Development Promise of Indian Microfinance 
(provisional title), New Delhi: Routledge. 
  
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Richard Palmer-Jones for his time, patience and invaluable feedback 
throughout the analysis and write-up of this study. I would also like to thank Arjan Verschoor and 
Ben D’Exelle for critical reviews, and the University of East Anglia for financial support. 
This paper is adapted from a chapter in the author’s PhD thesis. The full version is available upon 
request. Correspondence: M.Duvendack@uea.ac.uk  
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1 Introduction 
 
Microfinance interventions have become an important strategy in the fight against 
poverty for many developing countries. By the end of 2006, more than 10,000 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) existed worldwide serving an estimated 100 million 
microfinance borrowers (Dieckmann, 2007). Despite the popularity of microfinance, 
however, there is little convincing evidence that microfinance programmes have 
positive impacts. A number of studies suggest positive social and economic impacts 
of microfinance (e.g. Hulme and Mosley, 1996; Rutherford, 2001; Morduch and 
Haley, 2002; Khandker, 1998) although recent studies (e.g. Dichter and Harper, 2007; 
Banerjee et al, 2009; Roodman and Morduch, 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2009; 
Bateman and Chang, 2009) have raised doubts about the success of the microfinance 
phenomenon.  
 
Rigorous microfinance impact studies are rare and most fail to control for selection 
bias, undermining estimates of impact. It is argued that microfinance clients 
commonly self-select into a programme or are selected by their peers or the 
microfinance loan officers, biasing access to loans against the poorer. It is further 
hypothesized that this selection or screening process is driven by unobservable 
characteristics such as entrepreneurial abilities, access to social networks, risk taking 
preferences and business skills (Coleman, 1999). Those characteristics are notoriously 
difficult to measure and are poorly dealt with or neglected by advanced econometric 
techniques. Many positive evaluations of microfinance may be misleading because of 
their failure to account for selection-bias, and selection bias may account for the 
exclusion of poorer and other marginal groups. Selection bias occurs when the 
characteristics of those who are treated, i.e. those who save with or borrow from 
SEWA Bank, are different to the population at large, or more specifically the control 
group with which they are compared in order to estimate impact (Manski, 1995). If 
selection bias cannot be controlled for then the impact assessment is biased. It is 
frequently hypothesized that participants in microfinance have characteristics which 
are difficult to observe in quantitative studies which account in part for their being or 
becoming better off through association with the MFI (Coleman, 1999). 
 
This paper re-visits the evidence of the impact evaluation of SEWA Bank conducted 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in India in 1998 
and 2000 to illustrate the broader challenges of measuring the impact of 
microfinance. In particular, the challenges of controlling for selection bias and the 
role of the unobservables in this context are discussed in depth. Existing panel data 
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are subjected to propensity score matching (PSM) and panel data techniques which 
purport to eliminate selection bias in impact evaluations.2
 
  
The matching results are subjected to sensitivity analysis to assess their robustness; 
this is rather novel; sensitivity analysis of PSM was examined extensively by 
Rosenbaum (2002) and taken further by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006), and 
others, as discussed later in this paper. The few studies that have applied PSM to 
microfinance, e.g. Chemin (2008), Setboonsarng and Parpiev (2008), Arun, Imai and 
Sinha (2006) have not given sensitivity analysis much attention. 
 
The analysis of the survey data is supported by direct observation; both the 
sensitivity analysis and the direct observation suggest that selection processes driven 
by unobservables strongly influence who becomes a participant in microfinance (and 
progression from saver to borrower) and cannot be fully controlled by econometric 
techniques. Further doubt is thrown on the impact claims by the sampling strategy of 
the control group for the original USAID study, which is not sufficiently described in 
the literature. Also, the panel design is problematic because it does not have a ‘true’ 
baseline which would allow a before and after comparison, with the control and 
treatments groups shown to be equivalent before joining SEWA Bank, since the 
treatment groups had already joined SEWA Bank well before the baseline period. 
 
SEWA Bank members start as savers and the majority never progress to borrowing. 
The literature on the impact of savings on the well-being of the poor is scarce (see 
studies by Aportela, 1999; Ashraf, Karlan and Yin, 2006; and Devaney, 2006) since 
few MFIs offer savings products only. SEWA Bank is one of those MFIs that focuses 
on a savings approach and having more savers than borrowers (Chen and Snodgrass, 
2001); thus a further selection process segregates SEWA Bank members into 
borrowers and lenders, in which there may well also be a role of unobservables. Thus 
this paper also contributes to the literature by conducting various sub-group 
comparisons between borrowers, savers and controls and with a potential to shed 
some light on the impact of savings versus credit. Finally, I draw conclusions as to 
what these findings imply for the reliability of the original impact estimates provided 
                                                 
2 This is not the first attempt to re-examine the SEWA Bank study. Augsburg (2006) appears to be the 
first to re-investigate SEWA Bank’s cross-section results. However, her study focuses on examining 
merely three household-level income-related outcome variables. She applies PSM and the differences-
in-differences (DID) approach. Her results could not be fully replicated due to differences in the data 
re-construction; I contacted the author for her STATA do-files in order to comprehend her data 
analysis but she could not make them available. Her matching estimates were on average lower than 
the ones presented here in this study. I will not further refer to her study since this paper casts its net 
wider and re-analyses all of USAID’s outcome variables on the household, enterprise and individual 
level.  
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by USAID. I find that while the results presented by USAID cannot be contradicted, 
there are doubts about the quality of the PSM impact estimates, and sensitivity 
analysis suggests significant over-estimation of impact due to the presence of 
unobservables. The USAID control group sampling procedure and the panel design 
leave questions of comparability with the treatment group unanswered. As a result, 
it is also not possible to reject the hypothesis that unobservable differences in 
characteristics account for some at least and possibly most of the observed impact. I 
draw conclusions as to appropriate impact evaluation procedures, and the need for 
qualification to even apparently robust estimates of impact. 
 
This paper begins with by outlining the challenges of impact evaluations in the 
specific context of microfinance; this is followed by a brief description of SEWA 
Bank, its products, services and workings, drawing on my qualitative fieldwork 
during compilation of a repeat cross-section data set. Next, the research design and 
sampling procedures used by USAID and their data are described together with the 
estimation strategies; the analyses of USAID are replicated and PSM is applied to the 
data and sensitivity analysis conducted. Finally, the results are discussed in the light 
of my and other qualitative research on MFIs, before drawing conclusions. 
2 Challenges of microfinance impact evaluations 
 
Ultimately, microfinance impact studies are trying to find out how the lives of the 
poor would have turned out if microfinance had not been introduced. This is the 
problem of measuring the counterfactual which cannot be observed. Thus, every 
programme evaluation can only make an attempt at creating an estimate of such a 
counterfactual. Those estimates are then used to pinpoint the effect of the 
programme (Bryson, Dorsett and Purdon, 2002). The process of estimating 
counterfactuals commonly introduces biases which adversely affect impact 
evaluation results. Most impact assessors agree that future impact assessments 
should control for biases because ignoring them can greatly distort impact 
assessment results (Sebstad and Chen, 1996; Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 
2005; Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Coleman, 1999). Those are the challenges every 
impact evaluation has to grapple with and they are not unique to the context of 
microfinance impact evaluations.  
 
Apart from the anecdotal evidence provided by qualitative studies (e.g. Todd, 1996), 
the majority of microfinance impact evaluations have applied a quasi-experimental 
design; well-known examples include Hulme and Mosley (1996) and Pitt and 
Khandker (1998), as well as Coleman (1999) who uses an innovative pipeline quasi-
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experiment to tackle selection bias. As in the experimental design, quasi-experiments 
identify a treatment and a control group. However, the treatment group already 
participates in a microfinance intervention, and the control group should be as 
identical as possible to the treatment group in terms of economic and social 
characteristics apart from the microfinance intervention (Hulme, 2000).There are a 
number of problems with using a quasi-experimental design, namely the 
identification of equivalent control groups and the challenge of overcoming selection 
bias.  
 
In the case of microfinance, selection bias typically comes in the form of self-selection 
and non-random programme placement biases. According to Coleman (1999), self-
selection bias refers to microfinance programme members that have self-selected into 
a programme. The decision to participate may have been influenced by certain 
unobservable characteristics such as entrepreneurial skills, organisational abilities 
and motivation which tend to increase the likelihood of individuals to self-select into 
a programme. Coleman (1999) further argues that prospective borrowers will not 
only have to make a decision on programme participation but they will also have to 
gain acceptance from incumbent borrowers, i.e. their peers, who have also self-
selected into the programme. As a result, programme members will significantly 
differ from non-members in terms of motivation or wealth. In other words, 
programme participants usually self-select, meaning they choose to enter a 
microfinance programme in a non-random way or are selected by their peers. In 
addition, microfinance loan officers play a role in selecting borrowers. In other 
words, selection processes are driven by self-selection, selection by peers and by loan 
officers. Hence, impact studies need to address this problem because estimates 
obtained in the presence of selection bias will most likely be invalid. Moreover, 
programme placement can also be biased; MFIs assign new programme locations in 
non-random ways based, for example, on considerations for infrastructure or wealth 
(Hulme, 2000; Coleman, 1999). Some programmes, for example, are placed in areas 
which are easily accessible or the opposite could also be possible; programmes are 
placed in particular flood-prone areas (Pitt and Khandker, 1998). 
 
Partly in response to critical reviews of evaluations using observational (qualitative 
and quantitative) data there has been a trend towards using experimental tools, i.e. 
conducting randomised control trials (RCTs) of many development interventions 
including microfinance (see Duflo and Kremer, 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004 for 
general RCTs and Banerjee et al, 2009; Karlan and Zinman, 2009 for microfinance 
RCTs). RCTs claim to resolve the issue of selection bias. However, they are 
vigorously debated and many microfinance interventions lack crucial characteristics 
necessary for valid RCTs. In brief, there are threats to internal and external validity 
caused by lack of double-blinding and/or the presence of Hawthorne and John Henry 
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effects. For example, Hawthorne effects3 refer to behavioural changes in the 
treatment group while John Henry effects4
 
 relate to behavioural changes in the 
control group. For example, individuals in the treatment group might positively 
change their behaviour for the duration of the study as they feel thankful for 
receiving treatment and as a response to being observed. The same behavioural 
changes might apply to members in the control group who might positively or in fact 
negatively alter their behaviour (Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer, 2007). Those 
weaknesses apply to microfinance RCTs as well and will adversely affect the 
reliability of the impact estimates obtained. Hence, critics of RCTs argue that there is 
a continuing role for observational methods (Deaton, 2009; Heckman and Urzua, 
2009; Imbens, 2009 and Pritchett, 2009; see also Roodman and Morduch, 2009). 
The analysis in this paper seeks to understand whether analysis of the original 
USAID observational data, supplemented by my own re-survey, can throw light in 
particular on the existence and effects of selection on unobservables. Before outlining 
the specifics of the research design, data, sampling procedure and estimation 
strategy, the next section introduces SEWA Bank and its microfinance programme. 
3 The SEWA Bank context 
 
SEWA Bank, a cooperative bank headquartered in the Indian city of Ahmedabad, is a 
sister organisation of the Self Employed Women’s Association (SEWA). SEWA was 
established in 1972 as a trade union with the objective to organise self-employed 
women working in the informal sector. SEWA is not a mere trade union but a 
women’s movement with its origins in Ghandian philosophy based mainly on 
principles of truth, non-violence and self-sufficiency 
(http://www.sewabank.com/aboutus-origin.htm). Various sister organisation grew 
out of the SEWA movement such as SEWA Bank which provides microfinance 
products, Vimo SEWA which provides insurance services, SEWA Academy, which is 
responsible for training and research, and a number of other organisations which 
                                                 
3 In 1924 a series of experiments were conducted in the Hawthorne plant belonging to the Western 
Electric Company of Chicago. The aim of those experiments was to find out whether the productivity 
of workers could be improved with better lightening in the plant. Researchers found that workers 
increased their productivity irrespective of the lightening conditions which led to the conclusion that 
workers made an extra effort during their work precisely because of the knowledge of being observed 
(Duflo, Glennerster and Kremer, 2007; Levitt and List, 2009). 
4 John Henry effects refer to the “Ballad of John Henry” who was a rail worker and American folk 
hero. The ballad tells a tale of competition between rail workers and technical innovation which 
ultimately replaced rail workers. This tale can be related to the case of experimental design as 
discussed in Saretsky (1975).  
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offer a range of services to its female members (http://www.sewabank.com/aboutus-
origin.htm). 
 
Based on an initiative by Ela Bhatt, SEWA Bank was established in 1974 with the help 
of 4,000 SEWA members. The aim of SEWA Bank is to provide financial services such 
as savings and loan products to self-employed women. The bank has its base in 
urban Ahmedabad where it mainly operates individual savings and lending 
programmes but in the early 1990s it has also expanded into Gujarat’s rural areas 
where it provides its services through self-help groups (SHGs) 
(http://www.sewabank.com/rural-activities.htm).  
 
SEWA Bank emphasizes the provision of savings over credit (Chen and Snodgrass, 
2001). That is illustrated by the following figures: as of fiscal year (FY) 2007, SEWA 
Bank had 163,187 clients out of which 143,806 were savers and the remainder of 
20,011 were borrowers. SEWA Bank only targets women, not all of them are micro-
entrepreneurs, i.e. women that sell goods and services on their own account, but 
many work as casual labourers or sub-contractors. Furthermore, SEWA Bank targets 
minorities, e.g. roughly 25% of its clients are Muslims and the remainder are from 
scheduled castes and tribes and other backward castes (this information is taken 
from SEWA Bank’s internal management information system (MIS) which I had 
access to). To relate those figures to the overall population of Ahmedabad: according 
to the Census of India (2001), Ahmedabad has an overall population of close to 4.7 
million out of which 82.1% are Hindus (out of which 13% are scheduled castes and 
1% are scheduled tribes), 13% are Muslims and the remainder are Christians, 
Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains.  
 
SEWA Bank offers a range of savings products such as current deposit, fixed term 
deposit and ordinary savings accounts as well as loan products. Loans can be 
secured which requires physical collateral such as jewellery or a savings account or 
unsecured which requires a guarantor as ‘social’ collateral. In addition, housing loans 
are offered as well as emergency loans which many clients use to pay for weddings, 
funerals or other consumption-related expenditure. As of FY 2007, approximately 
49% of the loans disbursed were secured, 24% were unsecured and 27% were given 
as housing loans (this information is taken from SEWA Bank’s internal MIS). Loan 
sizes vary from 5,000 Rupees to 50,000 Rupees. All loans are provided under an 
individual lending scheme, SEWA Bank does not operate any group lending schemes 
in its urban operations.  
 
The loan application process works as follows: every potential SEWA Bank borrower 
is required to first open a savings account. SEWA Bank staff then monitors the 
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savings behaviour of those potential borrowers, i.e. the size and regularity of their 
savings. Potential borrowers qualify for loans once they have regularly deposited 
money in the savings account for at least 6 months (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001). 
However, those rules are often relaxed. SEWA Bank loan officers, so-called Bank 
Saathi (as explained in Box 1), are living in the communities they service and are 
responsible for recommending future clients whose creditworthiness they then assess 
as well. If a Bank Saathi feels that a future client is bankable, then SEWA Bank 
commonly does not reject the loan application; this suggests that informal networks 
around those Bank Saathi drive the selection and loan approval processes as 
described in Box 1. In addition, if a future client can provide collateral, either 
physical or ‘social’, i.e. in the form of a guarantor, a loan is usually granted without 
the need of having to open a savings account.  
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Box 1: Social capital at SEWA Bank 
The aim of the qualitative part of this study was to understand the selection processes 
from an ethnographic point of view. I wanted to understand how potential microfinance 
clients are recruited into SEWA Bank. To do this, I interviewed SEWA Bank staff and 
shadowed them in the field for several days in addition to interaction with them over 
design and fielding of a survey questionnaire.  
 
The SEWA Bank staff I talked to explained that the Bank’s ‘recruitment’ process works as 
follows: potential clients are generally recommended by people they know, i.e. family, 
friends or neighbours and are then referred to so-called Bank Saathi. The Bank Saathis are 
SEWA Bank’s voice in the field; they are the first point of contact for the clients and 
function as advisors and mediators. In other words, they are the link between SEWA Bank 
and the clients. Saathi literally means companion. Bank Saathis are clients themselves and 
live in the same neighbourhoods as ordinary SEWA Bank clients. According to 
information from SEWA Bank, an individual can become a Bank Saathi when she has been 
saving and borrowing with SEWA Bank for several years, has displayed impeccable 
financial behaviour, is honest, trustworthy and good at managing relationships as well as 
has a certain social standing in the community. Bank Saathis are responsible for savings 
and loan collections but also for recommending and identifying future clients. Bank 
Saathis are paid on a commission basis, i.e. the more clients they ‘recruit’ the more they 
earn. Unfortunately, I could not obtain any further information on the nature of those 
payments and their size in proportion to the Bank Saathis income. Once a Bank Saathi has 
identified a potential client, a member of SEWA Bank staff visits the potential client to 
initiate the loan approval procedure. I shadowed SEWA Bank staff on some of those visits 
and was surprised by the informality of the loan approval process. It was more like an 
informal conversation with the potential client and was completed within ten minutes. 
These visits were often not documented and the loan was usually granted after such a visit 
– i.e. on the basis of information produced in this process and trust in the network that led 
to it and without further investigations. I formed the impression that SEWA Bank staff 
were usually inclined to follow the recommendations of the Bank Saathi, mainly because 
they (the Bank Saathi) are presumed to know the potential clients, their family, friends 
and neighbours as they are living in the same communities (and can thus observe those 
variables that are unobservable to formal data production techniques). As a result, there is 
a lot of room for the Bank Saathis to abuse their information advantage and power as 
suggested by Ito (2003). My enumerators saw evidence of such abuse and observed that 
some Bank Saathi demanded 10% to 15% of the loan amount granted as an additional 
commission from the client. It appears that this informal screening or selection process 
does indeed play a role in explaining microfinance participation. However, the 
econometric tools commonly applied in the context of impact evaluations do not seem to 
be able to control for those unobservables that seem to be driving the screening or 
selection process. Based on my observations I conclude that an ethnographic approach 
could possibly be more appropriate for providing further insights and this would be a 
recommendation for future research in this area. 
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SEWA Bank is unique in many ways. It is not only one of India’s oldest and most 
established microfinance providers with a strong ideological base rooted in 
Ghandian traditions using struggle and development as a strategy to strengthen their 
members position in society but SEWA Bank also prefers to work in a cooperative 
structure and extend its financial services to individuals without the need for group 
formation. This cooperative structure allows SEWA Bank to focus on a savings 
approach. Typically, microfinance in India is offered by microfinance-NGOs (MF-
NGOs) which are registered as non-profit organisations. The registration as a non-
profit organisation limits their scope for providing financial services. The Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI), for example, prohibits all non-profit organisations from taking 
savings (Fisher and Sriram, 2002). Strictly speaking the MF-NGOs that do take 
savings are operating illegally. Thus, many organisations do refrain from mobilising 
savings because their organisational set-up simply does not allow it. Recently for-
profit MFIs have emerged, so-called Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs); 
examples include organisations like BASIX and SHARE. However, NBFCs, although 
regulated by the RBI, are also not allowed to take savings (Fisher and Sriram, 2002). 
Ghate (2007) as well as many practitioners (Karlan and Morduch, 2009) argue that 
this is a major drawback because the poor need savings more than credit as the next 
section will elaborate in more detail. 
4 Impact of savings 
 
As mentioned in section 3, SEWA Bank emphasizes savings over credit and had on 
average seven times more savers than borrowers as of FY 2007. SEWA Bank views 
credit merely as a complementary tool to savings, and hence I assess the impact of 
credit as well as savings to account for SEWA Bank’s distinctive approach. The 
objective of this section is to briefly introduce the savings literature and to review 
some of the key studies that assessed the impact of savings. 
 
Policy makers assumed for a long time that the poor are too poor to save and hence 
savings mobilisation was low on the agenda of many governments. This assumption 
has been questioned by Adams (1978) and von Pischke (1983) and further by 
Rutherford (2001) and Collins et al (2009). Rutherford (2001) claims that the poor 
have the capacity to save and traditionally used rotating savings and credit 
associations (ROSCAs) or other informal mechanisms to satisfy their savings needs. 
Indeed, savings are crucial for accumulating assets which in turn are used to finance 
future investments and consumption (von Pischke, 1983). Following Keynes (1936) 
and Browning and Lusardi (1996), Karlan and Morduch (2009) explain that 
individuals have various motives that encourage them to save such as 
“precautionary, life-cycle (to provide for anticipated needs), intertemporal 
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substitution (to enjoy interest), improvement (to enjoy increasing expenditure), 
independence, enterprise, bequest, avarice, and downpayment” (p. 39). It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to discuss the motivations of individuals to save in detail and 
hence I will refer the interested reader to a comprehensive review of the savings 
behaviour of individuals in developing countries which is provided by Rosenzweig 
(2001).  
 
Studies evaluating the impact of savings are scarce, some notable exceptions include 
the studies by Aportela (1999), Ashraf, Karlan and Yin (2006) and Devaney (2006) for 
a review. Dupas and Robinson (2009) conducted the first and so far only randomised 
control trial (RCT) assessing the impact of savings products. Most MFIs focus on 
providing credit as well as savings and a range of other services which makes it 
rather challenging to disentangle the impact of savings from all the other products 
and services that clients use at the same time, e.g. Burgess and Pande (2005) showed 
that financial access can reduce poverty but they could not separate the impact of 
savings from the impact of credit. 
 
Devaney (2006) reviewed eight impact studies - including the SEWA Bank study 
discussed in this paper - that focused on the impact of savings on the poor. The aim 
of most of those studies was to provide evidence that the poor have the capacity to 
save in the first place and to justify the need for savings products in addition to loan 
products. Moreover, the majority of those studies reviewed by Devaney (2006) 
investigated the impact of a particular savings product on the savings rate of the 
poor and found that savings had indeed a positive impact on the households’ 
savings rate. The most recent study on savings impact by Dupas and Robinson (2009) 
based on a field experiment in Kenya testing for the existence of savings constraints 
concluded that access to savings has positive impacts on income and productive 
investments. Furthermore, Devaney (2006) claims that borrowers are more likely to 
save than non-borrowers. However, most of those studies mentioned here did not 
compare the impact of saving versus the impact of borrowing versus not saving or 
borrowing at all. Only the study by Rogg (2000) and the SEWA Bank study under 
discussion in this paper are exceptions in this regard. It can be concluded that the 
literature in particular on the impact of saving versus borrowing is still rather 
underdeveloped, but is generally positive.  
 
In the Indian context, the RBI frequently turns a blind eye to the MFIs illegally 
mobilising savings because it recognised the importance of microfinance and savings 
in particular (Basu, 2006). A solution to the savings dilemma, i.e. the fact that MFIs 
are not officially allowed to mobilise savings but unofficially do so at times, is to 
register a MFI as a mutual benefit organisation, which allows it to be classified as a 
cooperative. SEWA Bank is one of the few microfinance providers that is registered 
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as an urban cooperative bank which means that savings can legally be mobilised 
(Fisher and Sriram, 2002). This organisational set-up is suitable for SEWA Bank’s 
activities since it allows its clients to save rather than access only credit. This paper 
returns to the issue of savings in section 7.6 when comparing the impact estimates of 
the various sub-groups, i.e. borrowers, savers and controls. The question is whether 
the data support the view that a savings approach - as advocated by Ghate (2007) 
and as implemented by SEWA Bank - is justified and desirable. After this brief 
introduction to SEWA Bank, the next section presents the research design and 
describes the data. 
5 Research design and description of data 
 
The study discussed here is one of three longitudinal USAID microfinance impact 
evaluations that were carried out between 1997 and 2000 on Mibanco in Peru, 
Zambuko Trust in Zimbabwe and SEWA Bank in India. All three studies share a 
similar research design and aim to examine the socio-economic impact of 
microfinance participation (Snodgrass and Sebstad, 2002). For the purpose of this 
study, the impact evaluation conducted on SEWA Bank is discussed in more detail in 
this section. 
 
The original SEWA Bank (henceforth USAID) study assesses the impact of SEWA 
Bank’s microfinance services on urban client households (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001). 
It examines hypotheses at the household, enterprise and individual level. The study 
hypothesized that microfinance participation at the household level leads to an 
increase in household income, more diversified income sources, housing 
improvements, an increase in household assets, better education of the household’s 
children, an increase in food expenditure and improved mechanisms for coping with 
shocks. At the enterprise level, microfinance participation leads to an increase in 
informal sector income, an increase in revenues and fixed assets, employment 
generation as well as better transactional relationships. At the individual level, 
microfinance clients might gain more control over the household’s resources and 
incomes, increase their self-esteem and self-confidence and increase personal savings 
and improve their ability to deal with the future (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001). Table 1 
outlines the details of the hypotheses tested and the corresponding impact variables. 
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Table 1: Hypotheses and impact variables of USAID study 
Household level 
Hypotheses Impact variable 
H1: increase of household income • Total annual household income 
• Household income per capita 
H2: more diversified income sources • Inverse Simpson’s index 
H3a: housing improvements • Expenditure on housing improvements and 
repairs in terms of material and labour 
H3b: increase of household assets • Expenditure on household assets, e.g. 
appliances, vehicles, jewellery 
H4: better education of the household’s 
children 
• Net enrolment ratios 
H5: increased food expenditure • Per capita expenditure per day for food and 
beverages 
H6: better coping with shocks • Mechanisms used for dealing with shocks 
Enterprise level 
E1: increase of informal sector income • Microenterprise income of previous month 
from household head and respondent 
E2: increase of revenues • Gross sales revenue of previous month 
E3: increase of fixed assets • Value of all fixed assets used in 
microenterprise 
E4: more employment generation • Hours worked in previous week 
• Days worked in previous month 
E5: better transactional relationships • Types of suppliers and customers 
Individual level 
I1: client gains more control of the 
households resources and income 
• Who took decision to take last loan? 
• Who took decision how to spend loan amount? 
• Who took decision how to spend income? 
I2: increase in self-esteem and self-
confidence 
• Respondent’s feelings with regard to her 
contribution to household 
• Is this contribution respected by other 
household members? 
I3: increase in personal savings • Existence of personal savings 
I4: better ability to deal with the future • Respondent’s feelings with regard to 
preparedness to deal with future 
• How does respondent prepare herself to deal 
with future? 
Source: Chen and Snodgrass (2001, p. 58). 
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In order to test the hypotheses outlined in Table 1, researchers collected baseline data 
on 900 women from low-income households across ten wards in Ahmedabad. The 
sampling criterion required the selection of women who were above 18 years and 
economically active. An economically active person is defined as somebody who 
engages in informal economic activities in the home, on the street or on business 
premises and who is either self-employed, a dependent producer or a wage worker 
(on an irregular basis without written contracts and/or fixed wages) (Chen and 
Snodgrass, 2001). Out of the 900 sample women, 600 were SEWA Bank clients – 
consisting of borrowers and savers - and 300 non-clients. The sampling procedure 
was based on a three-step process (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001). First, a geographical 
area was selected; Ahmedabad is split into 43 wards and USAID limited its survey to 
10 of those 43 wards due to budget constraints. The sample was drawn from the 
following ten wards in Ahmedabad: Behrampura, Jamalpur, Bapunagar, Rakhial, 
Asarwa, Khadia, Amraiwadi, Saraspur, Raikhad and Dudheshwar. The wards were 
selected based on the number of SEWA Bank clients residing in them. Almost half of 
all current clients live in those 10 wards (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001). Next, a random 
sample of borrowers and of savers was selected from a list provided by SEWA Bank 
which contained all its current borrowers and savers as of FY 1997, listed by ward. 
Savers should have made at least one deposit in a SEWA Bank savings account 
during FY 1997. Moreover, savers should not have taken out any loans in FY 1997. 
Replacements were made when the respondent could not be located, was not 
economically active, e.g. not self-employed anymore, or did not want to participate. 
Also, replacements were needed when respondents from the sample of current 
savers were not actively saving anymore or had taken out loans in FY 1998. 
 
The rationale for sampling borrowers as well as savers is explained by SEWA Bank’s 
emphasis of savings over credit - at the time of the USAID study there were ten 
savers for every borrower - hence USAID decided to gather a separate sample of 
savers. Chen and Snodgrass (1999) explain  
“that those clients who are savers only will benefit from having a secure place 
to deposit their savings. Since all borrowers have to save, it is hypothesized 
that there will be greater impact on those who borrow as well as save” (p. 16).  
Finally a non-client sample was chosen. USAID carried out a pre-survey “in the 
neighbourhood [Author’s note: it is not clear whether neighbourhood and ward are used 
interchangeably or whether neighbourhood refers to something else] of each of the 300 
sample borrowers to identify 50 households in which there were economically active 
women over age 18 who were not SEWA members” (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001, p. 
53). From those 15,000 households a random sample of 300 non-clients was drawn.  
 
Rosenbaum (2002) argues that the sampling of an appropriate control group is 
crucial in observational studies and in view of this the robustness of the USAID 
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sampling procedure of the control group is explored. Chen and Snodgrass (2001) 
argue that the neighbourhoods where most of SEWA Bank’s clients reside are 
reasonably homogenous in terms of caste, occupation and class (p. 53) and hence the 
control group is relatively similar to the treatment group. However, if the households 
in the control group are so similar, then why are they not clients of SEWA Bank? This 
points towards a selection process that is driven by unobservable characteristics 
which account for why otherwise apparently eligible households did not belong to 
SEWA Bank, and hence the control group sampling of USAID does not convince. 
Chen and Snodgrass (2001) admit that SEWA Bank members 
“are not chosen at random but are in fact purposefully selected from a larger 
population, both by themselves and by SEWA Bank. A woman must first self-
select by deciding to open a savings account and later to apply for a loan. 
Once she does so, SEWA Bank decides whether to provide her with the 
financial service in question” (p. 60).   
The first round (henceforth round 1) of the USAID survey was conducted in January 
1998 and a follow-up round (henceforth round 2) was then collected in January 2000. 
Between survey rounds, a rate of attrition of approximately 11 percent was observed, 
resulting in a final sample of 798 respondents (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001, p. 56). In 
addition to the two surveys, twelve case studies of SEWA Bank borrowers were 
conducted with the objective to provide a better understanding of the issues that 
SEWA Bank borrowers commonly have to deal with on a daily basis and how 
microfinance has helped them in the process (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001). Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics for respondents in round 1 and 2 for illustrative 
purposes. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of female research respondents 
 Borrowers Savers Controls 
Data collection round  R1 R2 R1 R2 R1 R2 
Sample size 264 264 260 260 262 262 
Mean age (years) 37.81 40.28 34.55 36.88 35.36 37.51 
Martial 
status in % 
Married 89.77 88.64 87.31 85 80.92 79.39 
Never married 1.89 1.89 5.77 4.62 5.73 5.73 
Divorced 0.76 0.76 1.15 0.38 1.15 0.38 
Deserted 0.38 0 1.54 1.15 1.15 1.53 
Widowed 7.2 8.71 4.23 8.85 11.07 12.98 
Religion in 
% 
Hindu 72.35 72.73 76.54 76.92 77.1 77.48 
Muslim 27.27 26.52 23.46 23.08 22.52 22.14 
Other 0.38 0.76 0 0 0.38 0.38 
Caste in % 
Upper caste 15.15 14.39 16.15 15.77 22.9 23.66 
Backward caste 45.45 46.97 40.77 43.85 39.31 40.46 
Scheduled caste 29.92 31.82 35.38 35.77 29.77 32.06 
Scheduled tribe 9.09 6.44 7.31 4.62 8.02 3.82 
No response 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Education 
Never attended school in 
% 39.77 40.15 40 41.92 40.84 44.66 
Mean highest grade 
completed 3.9 3.9 4.3 4.24 4.2 4.01 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
 
The data collected from both survey rounds was subjected to Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) in order to examine cross-section differences and Analysis of Covariance 
(ANCOVA) to evaluate whether any personal characteristics possibly influenced any 
impact variables. Chen and Snodgrass (2001) argue that ANCOVA would reduce 
selection bias to a certain degree. In addition, gain score analysis was employed to 
estimate the degree of change over time between treatment and control groups and 
to assess whether such changes were significant. The findings of the USAID study 
provide evidence that microfinance leads to changes at the household level, i.e. 
higher household income in terms of total income and per capita income was 
observed. In addition, minor positive impacts could be observed on income 
diversification, food expenditure and the ability to cope with shocks. However, the 
evidence was rather mixed. Impact at the enterprise and the individual levels were 
negligible. Chen and Snodgrass (2001) admit that measuring impacts at the 
enterprise and individual level were rather challenging because SEWA Bank clients 
are not classical micro-entrepreneurs. Most clients do not have micro-enterprises but 
are dependent sub-contractors or labourers, thus do not require micro-enterprise 
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capital. SEWA Bank provides loans for a range of purpose, e.g. business, housing 
improvements/repairs, repayment of other debts and consumption but without a 
particular focus on micro-enterprise development.  
 
Fungibility of money is a central problem in the context of microfinance impact 
evaluations and notoriously difficult to control for (Hulme, 2000). Money is 
considered to be fungible within the household, i.e. once a loan has been taken out by 
the borrower, it is difficult to track in which way the loan has actually been used 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). Based on the findings of the USAID study, it appears that 
measuring impact separately at the enterprise and individual level does not lead to 
particularly satisfactory results, and this is likely at least partly to be because of 
fungibility.  
 
As in the case of the USAID study, the majority of impact studies examine the impact 
of microfinance at multiple levels, i.e. at the household, enterprise and individual 
level; see Hulme and Mosley (1996), Sebstad et al (1995) and Gaile and Foster (1996) 
for a comprehensive overview of studies up to the mid 1990s. However, examining 
the impact at multiple levels requires sufficient funds and time. Moreover, solely 
looking at the individual, enterprise or community level has a number of 
disadvantages (see Table 3 for details). In particular the issue of fungibility (as 
mentioned earlier) has to be considered when assessing impact at the enterprise 
level. Hulme (2000) argues that “…for all studies except those that focus exclusively 
on ‘the enterprise,’ [then] a concern about fungibility may be irrelevant” (p. 85). He 
further argues that the most promising way to measure impact of microfinance 
appears to be at the household and institutional level. However, institutional level 
data are not available in this case. Hence, based on Hulme (2000) and after carefully 
examining Table 3, I conclude that re-examining the household level hypotheses of 
the USAID study appears to be the way forward due to issues of fungibility and 
difficulties of breaking down household level impacts to the individual level.  
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Table 3: Units or levels of evaluation and their advantages and disadvantages 
Unit Advantages Disadvantages 
Individual • Easily defined and 
identified 
• Most interventions have 
impacts beyond the individual 
  • Difficulties of disaggregating 
group impacts on “relations” 
Enterprise • Availability of analytical 
tools (profitability, return 
on investments, etc.) 
• Definition and identification is 
difficult in microenterprises 
• Much microfinance is used for 
other enterprises and/or 
consumption 
• Links between enterprise 
performance and livelihoods 
need careful validation 
  
  
Household • Relatively easy defined and 
identified 
• Permits an appreciation of 
livelihood impacts 
• Permits an appreciation of 
interlink-ages of different 
enterprises and 
consumption 
• Sometimes exact membership 
difficult to gauge 
 • The assumption that what is 
good for a household in 
aggregate is good for all of its 
members individually is often 
invalid 
  
Community • Permits major externalities 
of interventions to be 
captured 
• Quantitative data is difficult to 
gather 
  • Definition of its boundary is 
arbitrary 
Institutional Impacts • Availability of data 
• Availability of analytical 
tools (profitability, Subsidy 
Dependency Indices (SDIs), 
transaction costs) 
• How valid are inferences about 
the outcomes produced by 
institutional activity? 
  
Household 
Economic Portfolio 
(i.e. household, 
enterprise, 
individual and 
community) 
• Comprehensive coverage of 
impacts 
• Complexity 
• High Costs 
• Demands sophisticated 
analytical skills 
• Time consuming 
• Appreciation of linkages 
between different units 
 
 
Source: Hulme (2000, p. 83). 
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As mentioned earlier, the aim of this study is to re-visit the evidence of microfinance 
impact evaluations; hence the USAID panel data set has been subjected to more 
advanced econometric techniques, i.e. PSM to account for selection bias (see claims 
by Dehejia and Wahba, 1999 and 2002). In addition, a new cross-section data set 
(henceforth Round 3) was produced, with the aim of exploring the potential of 
indicators of social capital to illuminate the role of the unobservables and to compare 
the USAID panel with Round 3 to get a clearer picture on short-term versus long-
term impacts of microfinance. However, the Round 3 data have shortcomings. A 
further round of the panel could not be collected as neither the original panel sample 
SEWA Bank members not the controls could be identified. The sample size of 220 
households is rather small because of budget and time constraints. Hence, the Round 
3 data comparability to the USAID data is limited. Another point is that PSM 
requires rich and high quality data sets (Smith and Todd, 2005), but there are many 
missing data in Round 3, in particular in the social capital and the housing 
improvements section, which limits its explanatory power; hence Round 3 
quantitative data are not further discussed in this paper.5
 
 To conclude, it appears that 
low-cost and small surveys such as the Round 3 survey do not necessarily add value 
and do not provide accurate impact estimates.  
6 Estimation strategy 
 
This study replicates the USAID analysis and subjects these data to PSM to control 
for selection bias in the hope of providing more reliable impact estimates. PSM 
matches participants to non-participants on the basis of observable characteristics 
and compares outcomes between the treatment sample and the sample of matches 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005 and 2008; Rosenbaum and Silber, 2001). The 
underlying assumption is that there is no selection bias due to unobservable 
characteristics, though, whether this assumption holds is questionable; this is 
examined using sensitivity analysis of the PSM results which can suggest the 
presence and likely size of the effect of selection on unobservables (Rosenbaum, 
2002). We have seen earlier that in the case of microfinance unobservables are very 
likely to be present. 
 
To begin with, the empirical model is outlined. As mentioned earlier, the USAID 
study collected data on three sub-samples: borrowers, savers and controls. The 
                                                 
5 The quantitative results of Round 3 can be obtained from the author upon request. Qualitative 
information produced during the fieldwork are used. 
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objective is to assess the socio-economic impact of microfinance participation. 
Consider the following empirical specification; i stands for household in ward j: 
 
(1) 
           
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 = C𝑖𝑗δ +  X𝑖𝑗α +  𝑉𝑗β +  ε𝑖𝑗 
Where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗  = outcome on which impact is measured C𝑖𝑗 = level of participation in microfinance, i.e. a membership dummy variable 
δ  = effect of the microfinance programme, main parameter of interest X𝑖𝑗 = vector of household level characteristics 
𝑉𝑗 = vector of ward level characteristics 
𝛼,β  = unknown parameters 
ε𝑖𝑗  = error term representing unmeasured household and ward characteristics that 
can influence outcomes 
 
The characteristics of participants, i.e. borrowers and savers, are examined separately 
for round 1 and for round 2 using a logit model (Table 4). A treatment dummy 
denoting microfinance participation was created containing borrowers and savers to 
represent participants, i.e. C𝑖𝑗 as expressed in equation (1). This dummy is used as a 
dependent variable and assumes a value of 1 if an individual has self-selected into 
microfinance and a value of 0 if otherwise.  
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Table 4: Logit regression of probability of microfinance participation, without 
sampling weights6
Independent variables 
 
Round 1 Round 2 
Age household head -0.040*** -0.002 
  0.000 0.823 
Age respondent 0.019* 0.010 
  0.057 0.341 
Highest grade completed male 0.083***  0.001 
  0.003 0.956 
Respondent married (yes=1) 0.789***  0.760***   
  0.004 0.008 
Muslim (yes=1) 0.510**   0.434**   
  0.013 0.030 
Upper Caste (yes=1)  -0.666***  -0.682***  
  0.003 0.001 
Household size 0.011 -0.074 
  0.920 0.422 
Nuclear household (yes=1)  -0.453**   -0.293 
  0.042 0.174 
Non-SEWA savings -0.000 -0.000 
  0.190 0.695 
Constant -0.360 -0.413 
  0.713 0.679 
Number of observations 768 785 
Pseudo R-squared 0.059 0.032 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Notes:  p-values in italics. *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, 
***statistically significant at 1%. Please also note that the following control variables were included in 
the logit model: age, age squared, highest grade completed household head, highest grade completed 
respondent, sex household head (male=1), number of adult male in household, number of household 
members aged 0-14, subnuclear household (yes=1); all insignificant.  
 
Table 4 presents the logit regression estimating the probability of microfinance 
participation. The logit model is required to predict the propensity scores so that the 
matching procedure can be implemented – section 7 outlines this in more depth. The 
                                                 
6 Since SEWA Bank members are more likely to be savers than borrowers, i.e. as mentioned earlier 
there were ten savers for every borrower in rounds 1 and 2, there is a case for using appropriate 
weights. A separate set of logit regressions across rounds 1 and 2 were computed adjusted for 
sampling weights. However, the use of sampling weights led to very minor changes, i.e. slightly lower 
pseudo R-squared values and lower significance levels for few coefficients when sampling weights 
were applied. The results reported in this table do not consider sampling weights. 
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results presented in Table 4 show that the main variables associated with 
membership that are statistically significant in rounds 1 and 2 are being married, 
Muslim and upper caste. In addition, age of household head, age of respondent, 
highest grade completed male and nuclear household are significant in round 1. Few 
covariates are statistically significant and the values for the pseudo R-squared across 
both rounds are rather low which indicates that the model has limited explanatory 
power.7
7 Results 
  
 
The findings with respect to selected hypotheses are presented in this section. The 
individual and enterprise level hypotheses of the USAID study led to mixed and 
rather insignificant results. As argued earlier, measuring impact at these levels is 
unsatisfactory, and the household level is the most promising way to obtain 
meaningful impact estimates. Hence, this section focuses on selected household level 
results only, i.e. on income, housing expenditure and children’s education.8
 
 
Firstly, the selected household level results of the USAID study are replicated. 
Replication is an important step in validating results (Hamermesh, 2007). Hence, the 
USAID data9
 
 were subjected to ANOVA and ANCOVA. My replication closely 
reproduced the USAID study results and is thus not discussed further.  
Next, PSM is employed on the USAID data to gauge whether more advanced 
econometric techniques than ANOVA and ANCOVA, which claim to account for 
selection bias (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001), would produce different results. The 
original household level results of the USAID study are compared with the results 
obtained when PSM was applied using 5-nearest neighbour matching and kernel 
matching with a bandwidth of 0.01 (Table 5). Participants, i.e. borrowers and savers 
together, versus controls are presented first. Further sub-group comparisons are 
presented later in this paper.  
 
                                                 
7 I experimented with the logit model and tried various other control variables with the objective to 
enhance the explanatory power of the model but to no avail. The low explanatory power of the model 
has implications for the reliability of my PSM results; this is further investigated in section 7.3 where 
sensitivity analysis is introduced.  
8 The detailed and re-analysed results of all household level as well as individual and enterprise level 
hypotheses of the USAID study can be obtained from the author upon request. 
9 The data sets of all three USAID studies can be downloaded here: 
http://www.microlinks.org/ev_en.php?ID=4678_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC  
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Before discussing the results presented in Table 5 and Table 8 in more detail, a few 
remarks with regard to the implementation of PSM are required. The basic idea of 
matching is to compare a participant with one or more non-participants who are 
similar in terms of a set of observed covariates X (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005 and 
2008). This requires predicting propensity scores for each individual, i.e. participants 
as well as non-participants using a logit or a probit model. I used the logit model 
presented in Table 4 to predict those propensity scores. Then, before implementing 
the actual matching process, I examined whether the propensity scores I had 
obtained for participants and non-participants fulfil the common support 
assumption. Caliendo and Hujer (2005) express the common support assumption as 
follows:  
(2)   0 < Pr (𝐷 = 1 | 𝑋) < 1 
This assumption indicates whether treatment and control groups provide equal 
support of X (Caliendo, 2006). This can be investigated graphically. Figure 1 presents 
the distribution of the propensity score for participants as well as non-participants; it 
shows that each participant with a certain propensity score has a corresponding non-
participant. In other words, if the propensity scores for participants and non-
participants overlap reasonably well, then the common support assumption is 
satisfied and it is recommended comparing those two groups. Next, the differences 
in the outcome variables for participants and their matched non-participants are 
calculated (Morgan and Harding, 2006) as presented in Table 5 and Table 8. 
Furthermore, I used t-tests10
Table 5
 before and after matching for all results presented in 
 and Table 8 to examine the differences of the mean values for each covariate 
X across treatment and control groups. In addition, those t-tests calculated a ‘bias’ 
defined as the mean value of the treatment group and the (matched/unmatched) 
control group divided by the square root of the average sample variance in the 
treatment group and the (matched/unmatched) control group. The t-tests I employed 
indicate that the differences between treatment and control groups as well as the 
‘bias’ were reduced considerably in most cases, hence the matching process was 
successful in generating a control group that was reasonably similar to the treatment 
group. Therefore, the use of PSM is justified in this case. As a consequence, I 
conclude that the balancing properties of the propensity scores were satisfied in all 
cases. 
  
                                                 
10 The STATA command pstest was used. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of propensity scores for participants and non-participants  
 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
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Table 5: PSM impact estimates of selected household level results – microfinance 
participants versus controls; without sampling weights11
  
  
Round 1 Round 2 
Total household income per annum in Rupees 
USAID 10,090*** 15,302*** 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching 8,944*** 14,635*** 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 8,638*** 13,786*** 
Total household income per annum per capita in Rupees  
USAID 2,063*** 2,685*** 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching 2,019*** 2,486*** 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 1,913*** 2,537*** 
Expenditure for housing improvements in Rupees 
USAID 3,748*** 5,871 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching 3,701*** 6,546*** 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 3,484*** 6,504*** 
School enrolment for girls aged 5 to 10 
USAID -0.020 -0.005 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching 0.011 0.052 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 0.010 0.028 
School enrolment for boys aged 5 to 10 
USAID 0.065 0.005 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching -0.027 0.021 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 -0.007 -0.004 
School enrolment for girls aged 11 to 17 
USAID 0.015 -0.015 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching 0.028 0.012 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 0.006 0.009 
School enrolment for boys aged 11 to 17 
USAID -0.075 -0.020*** 
PSM - 5 nearest neighbour matching -0.025 -0.012 
PSM - kernel matching, bandwidth 0.01 -0.045 -0.019 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Notes:  *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
The results in this table refer to the differences in the mean values between matched samples; they 
were obtained using the STATA command psmatch2. I also ran the STATA command pscore with the 
                                                 
11 With reference to footnote 6, the literature is unclear on how to accommodate sampling weights in 
the context of matching, hence the analysis was run with and without weights providing conclusive 
results. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this further but the interested reader is welcome 
to contact the author for more information.  
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objective to cross-check the psmatch2 results across the various matching algorithms. The results I 
obtained from the different STATA routines displayed minor differences in terms of the size of 
coefficient and the level of significance. Morgan and Winship (2007) argue that matching results can 
vary depending on the matching algorithm and PSM routine applied. Results are bootstrapped. 
 
7.1  Income12
The results for income per annum
 
13, income per annum per capita14
                                                 
12 All income figures throughout this study have been deflated to January 1998 prices by using a 
deflator of 1.156 – as mentioned in the USAID study. This was the value of the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI-IW) for Ahmedabad in January 2000, expressed on a base of January 1998. 
 and expenditure 
for housing improvements are positive and statistically significant across rounds 1 
and 2. Those results reflect the differences between participants and non-
participants. For example, according to the USAID round 1 result; income per annum 
was higher by 10,090 Rupees for microfinance participants than for non-participants 
whereas the PSM results applying 5-nearest neighbour matching show that income 
per annum increased by 8,944 Rupees for participants. Similarly, the PSM results 
applying kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.01 display an increase in income per 
annum by 8,638 Rupees for microfinance participants. It can be seen that the degree 
of impact depends on the econometric technique applied but even when the same 
technique is applied, i.e. PSM, the impact estimates still vary - though not 
substantively so - because of the different matching algorithms applied. For example, 
kernel matching estimates with a bandwidth of 0.01 for income per annum and for 
income per annum per capita are lower than the respective 5-nearest neighbour 
matching estimates for rounds 1 and 2. Also, when the bandwidth increases in the 
case of kernel matching, the impact estimate tends to increase as well. However, 
13 Income per annum is confounded with household size and hence an unreliable measure of outcome. 
However, since USAID assesses the impact on income per annum and since I am comparing their 
results with mine, I will continue to report income per annum results throughout the paper. 
Nonetheless, the reader should treat those results with caution. 
14 An additional calculation not reported here was completed for total household income per annum 
per capita across rounds 1 and 2 as presented in Table 5; I made adjustments using an equivalence 
scale. Equivalence scales commonly allow the comparison of per capita income of households of 
various sizes and compositions on an equal basis. A range of equivalence scales exist and choosing 
one is a rather arbitrary process. The following equivalence scale adjusting for the various household 
sizes and compositions is used here: (𝐴 + 𝑃𝐾)𝐹; where A = number of adults ≥ 18, K = number of 
children < 18, P = 0.7 which is the recommended percent value indicating how much each child 
contributes to the households consumption relative to the adults, and F = 0.65 – 0.75, a factor that 
accounts for economies of scales (Source: http://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/method/oakvos.htm). The 
application of this formula led to a minor increase in the size of the coefficient of per capita income per 
annum but the significance level remained the same. Since there is no clear recommendation as to 
which one of the equivalence scales to use and their application is debated, I decided to report total 
household income per annum per capita without making any adjustments.  
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these observations are not common to all outcome variables or rounds as Table 5 
clearly demonstrates. 
 
Overall, in the case of income per annum, income per capita and expenditure for 
housing improvements across round 1 and 2, the general trend and the statistical 
significance are similar across USAID and PSM results. In other words, the results 
obtained by applying PSM appear to support the original findings of USAID with the 
exception that the USAID results for expenditure for housing improvements in 
round 2 were not statistically significant while the PSM results are statistically 
significant. 
 
7.2  School enrolment 
The PSM results for school enrolment for girls aged 5 to 10 across rounds 1 and 2 
display a positive trend, i.e. participants do better than non-participants, but none of 
the results are statistically significant. The respective USAID results are negative but 
also insignificant. The results for school enrolment for girls aged 11 to 17 across 
round 1 and 2 are equally meaningless, USAID argues that there is an increase in 
school enrolment in round 1 but the impact estimate is suddenly negative in round 2. 
The PSM results are all positive but insignificant. 
The picture does not change dramatically when looking at school enrolment figures 
for boys aged 5 to 10 and 11 to 17. According to the PSM results across all three 
rounds, microfinance has negative impacts on the school enrolment of boys aged 5 to 
10 with the exception of one value in round 2 obtained by applying 5-nearest 
neighbour matching which implies a negligible positive impact. The USAID results, 
on the other hand, indicate a positive impact but none of the results are statistically 
significant. Chen and Snodgrass (2001) argue that most boys in the age group 5 to 10 
are in fact already enrolled in school irrespective of microfinance participation. All 
enrolment figures for boys aged 11 to 17 are negative across USAID and PSM results 
for round 1 and 2 with one figure being statistically significant. Hence, it can be 
concluded that microfinance participation does not seem to have any significant 
impact on children’s education.  
 
Overall, the most notable result is that there seems to be a positive impact on total 
income per annum and per capita as well as on expenditure for housing 
improvements. Before applying panel methods, the quality of the matching results 
needs to be assessed using sensitivity analysis.  
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7.3  Sensitivity analysis 
The impact evaluation of SEWA Bank needs to answer the question whether the 
apparent effect of membership compared to the control group is due to the saving 
and borrowing enabled by membership of SEWA Bank or some unobserved 
characteristic of members compared to the control group, such as entrepreneurial 
abilities, access to social networks, etc. PSM allows control for observable 
characteristics included in the propensity score on which members and controls are 
matched, but it cannot control for unobservables (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005 and 
2008; Rosenbaum and Silber, 2001). Rosenbaum (2002) developed the “conceptual 
advance” (ibid, p. 106) of Cornfield et al (1959) that the robustness of the estimate of 
the difference in outcome between treatment and control groups (the impact 
estimate) could be assessed by asking what magnitude of selection on unobservables 
(hidden bias) one would need in order to explain away the observed impact, thus: 
“[I]f the association [Author’s note: between treatment and outcome] is strong, the hidden 
bias needed to explain it is large” (Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 106). In the context of death 
from lung cancer for smokers and non-smokers Cornfield et al (1959) suggested that 
if the ratio of the likelihood of death from lung cancer for smokers to the likelihood 
of death from lung cancer for non-smokers was high then a similar high ratio for the 
unobserved characteristic(s) would be required to make this unobserved 
characteristic the true cause of the higher prevalence of death from lung cancer by 
smokers.  
Rosenbaum (2010) explains that “a sensitivity analysis in an observational study asks 
how the conclusions of the study might change if people who looked comparable 
were actually somewhat different…” (p. 367). In other words, the objective of 
sensitivity analysis is to explore whether the matching estimates are robust to 
selection on unobservables (Rosenbaum, 2002). Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) 
argue that “sensitivity analysis should always accompany the presentation of 
matching estimates” (p. 19). 
 
Rosenbaum (2002) invites us to imagine a number Γ (gamma) (≥ 1) which captures 
the required degree of association, of an unobserved characteristic with the 
treatment, for it (the unobserved characteristic) to explain the observed impact. Γ is 
the ratio of the odds15 that the treated have this unobserved characteristic to the odds 
that the controls have this characteristic.16
                                                 
15Odds, which are widely used in assessing probabilistic outcomes, are derived from probabilities (0 ≤ 
𝜋𝑖 ≤ 1) by the following formula: 𝜋𝑖 (1 − 𝜋𝑖)⁄ . 
 
16 Suppose two individuals j & k who are closely matched on observables so that xj = xk, but for whom 
pj not equal to pk - i.e. probability of being selected into SEWA Bank is not the same despite being 
equivalent on observables. The probability of being selected can be expressed as an odds ratio (the 
odds of probability of j/k (pj/pk) being selected pj/(1-pj) or pk/(1-pk)). Then imagine there is a number Γ 
(gamma) such that 1/ Γ ≤ {pj(1-pk)}/{pk(1-pj)} ≤ Γ, then if Γ =1 pj=pk (i.e. there is no difference in the 
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This approach can be implemented using the rbounds procedure in STATA (Becker 
and Caliendo, 2007); this procedure uses the data to calculate the confidence intervals 
(for a given level of confidence – e.g. 95%) of the outcome variable for different 
values of Γ. A value of Γ that produces a confidence interval that encompasses zero is 
one that would make the estimated impact not statistically significant at the relevant 
level of confidence. If Γ is rela tively sma ll (sa y <  2 ) then one ma y a ssert tha t the 
likelihood of such an unobserved characteristic is relatively high, and therefore that 
the estimated impact is rather sensitive to the existence of unobservables (DiPrete 
and Gangl, 2004). If there is other evidence that there may be unobservables, such as 
my qualitative observations of the SEWA Bank selection processes, we cannot be 
confident that the estimated impact is not due to unobservables.  
 
We can illustrate this approach by calculating Γ at which the estimated impact of 
SEWA Bank membership on household income per capita for round 1 is no longer 
statistically significant. Table 5 shows that the 5-nearest neighbour matching estimate 
for total household income per annum per capita in round 1 is 2,019 Rupees which is 
significant at 1%. This suggests that households participating in microfinance earn 
significantly more income per annum per capita than control households; however, 
this may not be due to membership per se but unobserved characteristics that account 
for membership (and or its impact). Sensitivity analysis explores the robustness of 
this impact estimate and demonstrates how it changes in the presence of selection on 
unobservables. The STATA procedure rbounds reports the estimates17
Table 6
 and their 95% 
(or other) confidence intervals for matched pairs of SEWA Bank members and 
controls (see ).  
 
When Γ = 1 there is no selection on unobservables. If Γ increases to 1.2, then matched 
individuals differ in their odds of exposure to microfinance by a factor of 1.2 due to 
selection on unobservables. Table 6 shows that when Γ = 1.2 the statistical 
significance level ranges from < 0.0001 to < 0.0046. This implies that in this case 
selection on unobservables is not likely to explain the observed association between 
exposure to microfinance and higher income levels. However, when Γ = 1.3 or more, 
a relatively small difference in the odds of exposure implying that it is quite likely 
that such an unobserved confounding variable exists, the 95% confidence interval of 
                                                                                                                                                        
odds of being selected). Γ =2 means that individual j is twice as likely to be selected into SEWA Bank 
as individual k. This might be considered not unlikely based on my observations of the selection 
process operated by SEWA Saathi, and by my understanding of the requirements of households to be 
able to save, and for other to qualify for borrowing. 
17 In this case we use Hodges-Lehmann point estimates (see Rosenbaum, 2002). These are median 
shifts between treatment groups. Therefore, they are likely to be smaller than the mean shifts reported 
in Table 5 which provides the average treatment effects.  
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the point estimates encompasses zero. Consequently, we can argue that the observed 
impact of SEWA Bank membership on household income per capita is not 
significantly different from zero, and the association between microfinance exposure 
and higher income levels may well be due to unobservables.  
 
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis for household income per annum per capita in Rupees 
for microfinance participants for round 1: magnitude of selection on unobservables, 
range of significance levels, Hodges-Lehmann point estimates and confidence 
intervals 
 Significance levels Hodges-Lehmann point 
estimates 
95% Confidence 
intervals 
Gamma 
(Γ) 
Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
1 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 953 953 520 1,403 
1.2 < 0.0001 < 0.0046 559 1,357 141 1,834 
1.3 < 0.0001 < 0.0330 391 1,545 -27 2,033 
1.4 < 0.0001 < 0.1292 241 1,717 -174 2,220 
1.5 < 0.0001 < 0.3181 98 1,876 -311 2,394 
1.6 < 0.0001 < 0.5561 -31 2,036 -436 2,562 
1.7 < 0.0001 < 0.7637 -148 2,188 -556 2,732 
1.8 < 0.0001 < 0.8967 -261 2,328 -669 2,891 
Source: Author’s own calculations.   
Notes: see footnote 17.  
 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on all the outcome variables presented in Table 5; 
testing the sensitivity of all impact estimates on the household, enterprise and 
individual level across rounds 1 and 2. The evidence provided by those tests are in 
agreement with the description above, namely that the impact estimates presented in 
Table 5 are sensitive to selection on unobservables and should be treated with 
caution.18
                                                 
18 The detailed results from those sensitivity tests are not presented here but the relevant STATA do-
files can be made available upon request.   
 In other words, the impact estimates presented here are all potentially 
overstated due to the presence of selection on unobservables. PSM appears to control 
for selection on observables only and fails to account for unobservables which are 
quite likely to exist. However, this is considered a worst case scenario and does not 
prove that there is no effect since it assumes both that the unobserved variable has 
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the specific effect on the odds ratio of treatment and that it has a strong effect on the 
outcome variable (DiPrete and Gangl, 2004, p. 291). Nevertheless, PSM and related 
tests allow the quantification of selection on unobservables which is helpful. These 
results lead me to concur with Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006), namely that 
sensitivity testing should always complement the presentation of matching 
estimates. In this case caution in concluding that SEWA Bank membership has a 
causal effect on per capita income is warranted. 
 
7.4  Panel analysis  
The panel data analysis with or without PSM reveals nothing new and broadly 
confirms the results obtained from the cross-section analysis. As illustrated in Table 
7, PSM using nearest neighbour matching on round 1 data caused some households 
which did not match on observable characteristics to be dropped, and only matched 
households were merged with round 2 data. Using the treatment and matched 
households a regression-adjusted differences-in-differences (DID) model was run on 
all outcome variables as set out by the following equation which is a fixed effects 
linear regression model; i stands for household in ward j at period t: 
(3)                𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽C𝑖𝑡 +  θX𝑖𝑡 +  𝑉𝑗 +  ε𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  = outcome on which impact is measured at period t C𝑖𝑡 = level of participation in microfinance, i.e. a membership dummy variable, in 
period t X𝑖𝑡 = vector of household level characteristics in period t 
𝑉𝑗 = vector of ward level characteristics 
𝛼𝑖 = fixed effects unique to household i 
𝛿𝑡 = period effect common to all households in period t 
β, θ  = unknown parameters 
ε𝑖𝑗𝑡  = error term representing unmeasured household and ward characteristics at 
period t 
Some evidence was found that there are positive and significant impacts at the 
household, enterprise and individual level as outlined by Table 7.  
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Table 7: PSM and DID results - impact of microfinance participation; without 
sampling weights19
Household level hypotheses 
 
Total household income per annum in Rupees 11,287*** 
Total household income per annum per capita in Rupees 2,181*** 
Inverse Simpson index 0.121 
Expenditure for housing improvements in Rupees 5,628*** 
Expenditure on household assets in Rupees 734** 
School enrolment for girls aged 5 to 10 -0.019 
School enrolment for boys aged 5 to 10 0.019 
School enrolment for girls aged 11 to 17 0.025 
School enrolment for boys aged 11 to 17 -0.011 
Food expenditure per day per capita in Rupees 0.93 
Enterprise level hypotheses 
Informal sector income of whole household - per month in Rupees 3,091** 
Informal sector income of respondent only - per month in Rupees 1,876** 
Microenterprise revenues of all enterprises in household - per month in 
Rupees 3,050** 
Microenterprise revenues of microenterprises for which respondent is 
primarily responsible - per month in Rupees 1,559** 
Current value of fixed assets of all microenterprises in household in 
Rupees 211 
Current value of fixed assets of microenterprises for which respondent 
is primarily responsible in Rupees 482 
Hours worked in previous week in all microenterprises in household 13.78*** 
Days worked in previous month in all microenterprises in household 10.17*** 
Main types of suppliers - inferior20 0.060*  suppliers? Yes=1, No=0 
Main types of customers - inferior21 0.083**  customers? Yes=1, No=0 
Individual level hypotheses 
Respect by other household members? Yes=1, No=0 0.015 
Prepared to deal with future? Yes=1, No=0 0.019 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Notes:  *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
The STATA procedure xtreg was applied to implement DID. 
 
                                                 
19 As discussed in footnote 6 and 11. 
20 Individuals/households and retailers are inferior sources of supply as defined by Chen and 
Snodgrass (2001). 
21 Individual consumers are considered to be inferior customers as defined by Chen and Snodgrass 
(2001). 
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These findings are broadly in agreement with the results that USAID presented. 
However, caution is required when interpreting the panel data findings. One would 
have expected some differences between the cross-section and panel data results 
since panel analysis should account for the unobservables but, this appears not to 
have been the case in this study. However, one could argue that the USAID dataset is 
not a real panel with a ‘true’ baseline because round 1 respondents were already 
microfinance clients when the baseline dataset was collected. The same clients and 
control households were then re-surveyed two years later. Strictly speaking, the 
baseline should have collected data on households that were not participating in 
microfinance at the time of the baseline data collection but became microfinance 
clients between survey rounds. This would have allowed a before and after 
comparison which would have been better suited to the analysis because it would 
have been possible to compare the treatment and control households in terms of all 
observables including outcomes; this would have allowed one to assess whether 
these two samples were broadly similar in these terms, although it would still not be 
possible to control for unobservables which affect response to the treatment.  
 
7.5  Summary 
Most of the PSM results confirm the findings of the USAID study if one ignores 
unobservables. What does this outcome mean for the issue of selection bias and the 
utility of PSM? Chen and Snodgrass (2001) argue that ANCOVA using a suitable 
control group accounts for selection bias to a certain degree. Based on the PSM 
results presented in Table 5, the first impression is that this assessment is indeed 
accurate. However, doubts remain as there are strong qualitative and theoretical 
reasons to think that unobservables have not been fully controlled for. This notion is 
confirmed by the sensitivity analysis which shows that the matching estimates are 
quite sensitive to selection on unobservables. 
Also, the quality of the matches is doubtful; PSM requires rich and large datasets in 
order to function properly (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith and Todd, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005). Moreover, the panel does not resolve 
the issue because it is not a ‘true’ panel, and, even if it were, might not control for the 
effects of unobservables. Microfinance clients might have been better off than non-
clients even before participating in microfinance, i.e. in terms of access to social 
networks, wealth, skills or motivations and this might have led them to self-select or 
to be selected into microfinance either by their peers or the staff of the microfinance 
organisation, and to be able to benefit more from membership that otherwise 
observationally similar households.  
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7.6  Sub-group comparisons 
Having reached these preliminary conclusions with regard to membership of SEWA 
Bank, whether as saver or (saver and) borrower, sub-group comparisons were 
conducted to understand the impact of savings compared to saving and borrowing. 
As argued in section 3 and 4, Ghate (2007), as well as many microfinance 
practitioners, believe that the poor need savings more than credit. The following 
comparisons were investigated: borrowers versus controls, savers versus controls, 
borrowers versus savers, one-time borrowers versus savers, repeat borrowers versus 
savers, one-time borrowers versus controls and repeat borrowers versus controls. 
Again, only the key findings are presented. The results of the comparisons of the 
various borrower groups with savers are similar to the various borrower group 
comparisons with controls in terms of absolute numbers and level of significance, 
hence only the latter comparisons are discussed.22
  
  
                                                 
22 The detailed and re-analysed results of all household level as well as individual and enterprise level 
hypotheses across all sub-group comparisons of the USAID study can be obtained from the author 
upon request. 
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Table 8: Selected household level PSM results – sub-group comparisons; without 
sampling weights23
  
 
Total household 
income per annum 
Total household 
income per annum per 
capita 
Expenditure for 
housing 
improvements 
5-nearest 
neighbou
r 
Kernel 
matching, 
bandwidth 
0.01 
5-nearest 
neighbour 
Kernel 
matching, 
bandwidt
h 0.01 
5-nearest 
neighbour 
Kernel 
matching, 
bandwidth 
0.01 
Borrower versus control 
Round 1 12,323*** 12,323*** 2,364*** 2,347*** 5,046*** 5,069*** 
Round 2 17,915*** 18,256*** 3,222*** 3,378*** 8,137** 8,160** 
Borrower versus saver 
Round 1 9,152*** 9,020*** 1,567** 1,405* 3,700** 3,349** 
Round 2 11,014*** 10,141*** 1,634** 1,634** 4,547 4,115 
Saver versus control 
Round 1 7,236** 6,472** 1,545** 1,431** 2,212** 1,858* 
Round 2 10,162*** 10,085*** 1,899*** 1,909*** 5,044*** 4,508* 
One-time borrower versus control 
Round 1 11,196** 12,212*** 1,998** 2,186** 5,125*** 5,107*** 
Round 2 30,099*** 27,700*** 5,500*** 5,669*** 18,619* 18,468* 
Repeat borrower versus control 
Round 1 17,556*** 15,738*** 3,410*** 3,203*** 6,059*** 6,027*** 
Round 
2# 2,319  1,112  -825  
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
Notes:  *statistically significant at 10%, **statistically significant at 5%, ***statistically significant at 1%. 
All figures in Indian Rupees. The results in this table refer to the differences in the mean values 
between matched samples; they were obtained using the STATA command psmatch2. I also ran the 
STATA command pscore with the objective to cross-check the psmatch2 results across the various 
matching algorithms. The results I obtained from the different STATA routines displayed minor 
differences in terms of the size of coefficient and the level of significance. Morgan and Winship (2007) 
argue that matching results can vary depending on the matching algorithm and PSM routine applied. 
# No values for kernel matching in round 2, the sample was too small with propensity scores outside 
the common support region, no adequate matches were found. Results are bootstrapped. 
 
The discussion of sub-group comparisons focuses on selected household level 
hypotheses, namely income per annum, income per annum per capita24
                                                 
23 As discussed in footnotes 
 and 
6, 11 and 19, the literature is unclear with regard to accommodating 
sampling weights in the context of matching. Hence, as before, the analysis across all sub-group 
comparisons across rounds 1 and 2 was conducted with and without sampling weights and the results 
obtained in both cases were conclusive. The author can be contacted for more information on this 
topic.  
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expenditure for housing improvements. The outcome variables with regard to 
children’s education were dropped because their results were mostly insignificant 
across all rounds and across all sub-group comparisons, hence confirming the earlier 
findings of the cross-section and panel data analysis. Again, 5-nearest neighbour 
matching as well as kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.01 were the matching 
algorithms of choice. 
 
The PSM results in Table 8 indicate that borrowers do significantly better than 
controls across all three outcome variables. In detail, in the borrower versus control 
comparison the results of the outcome variables income per annum and income per 
annum per capita are consistent across rounds 1 and 2 in terms of size of impact and 
level of significance but with slightly higher absolute impact figures in round 2. This 
suggests that impact strengthens over time, i.e. the longer a client is participating in 
microfinance the more likely he or she is to reap benefits, but these additional 
advantages are slight once a saver has become a borrower. Similar trends can be 
observed in the borrower versus saver comparison where the coefficients are smaller 
than in the borrower versus control comparison. 
 
Similarities can also be observed in the savers versus control comparison where the 
outcome variables income per annum and income per annum per capita are 
consistent across rounds 1 and 2 in terms of size of impact and level of significance 
but their absolute impact figures are slightly lower than the ones reported in the 
borrower versus control comparison. To conclude, savers do better than controls but 
are slightly worse off than borrowers, which is to be expected. As mentioned earlier, 
the SEWA Bank model is built around mobilising savings. As of FY 1997, SEWA 
Bank had on average ten times more savers than borrowers. Hence, it appears that 
focusing on a savings approach is indeed a desirable strategy since savers have 
significantly higher impact estimates than control group members.  
 
However, no clear picture seems to emerge when comparing one-time borrowers 
versus controls with repeat borrowers versus controls; in part this is because sample 
sizes are small. Comparing round 1 figures only, it appears that repeat borrowers do 
significantly better than one-time borrowers who do better than controls, and both 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 Total household income per annum per capita was re-calculated using the formula for the 
equivalence scale described in footnote 14. The equivalence scale adjusted results in Table 8 are 
conclusive with the ones presented in Table 5, and hence following the earlier procedure the results 
that are not adjusted are reported. 
Duvendack, M.                         DEV Working Paper 24 
 
42 
 
do better than savers. When using round 2 figures the reverse appears to be true, 
with repeat borrowers worse off than one-time borrowers; and savers.25
 
 
The evidence provided by those sensitivity analyses on selected outcome variables is 
presented in Table 8 (i.e. only significant matching estimates were tested). These 
results concur with those presented earlier in this paper, namely that the results are 
very sensitive to selection on unobservables;26
 
 and the results of the sub-group 
comparisons overstate the impact of microfinance participation. 
8 Conclusion 
 
This study contributes to the impact evaluation literature by providing new insights 
from re-analysing the existing USAID panel data with PSM and DID; it contributes to 
the microfinance literature by throwing doubt on the claims of impact of a well 
known microfinance project. The basic PSM results presented in this paper 
approximate those obtained by USAID, i.e. borrowers do better than savers who in 
turn do better than controls. Presented in this way, these findings broadly support 
the existing belief that savings by themselves are desirable and that savings tools are 
complementary to a credit approach. The evidence is inconclusive whether repeat 
borrowers do better than one-time borrowers, and it appears that this is not always 
the case. The estimates obtained from the repeat borrower versus control comparison 
are unreliable due to small sample sizes which did not allow implementation of an 
adequate matching procedure. 
 
However, sensitivity analysis of the PSM estimates shows that the matching 
estimates do not appear to be particularly reliable as they indicate high sensitivity to 
selection on unobservables. This supports qualitative evidence from this study and 
the literature (Ito, 2003; Fernando, 1997) of the presence of strong selection on 
unobservables. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the more likely true impact 
estimates would be significantly lower, and possibly not significantly different from 
                                                 
25 A word of caution, round 1 defines repeat borrowers as borrowers who have taken out more than 
two loans. In round 2, repeat borrowers refer to borrowers who have repaid their earlier loan and 
have taken out a new loan between survey rounds. There are only 56 repeat borrowers between the 
two survey rounds. The definition of repeat borrowers differs across rounds which would explain the 
inconsistency of the results. The sample size of 56 is simply too small to provide any meaningful PSM 
results. 
26 The detailed results from those sensitivity tests are not presented here but the relevant STATA do-
files can be made available upon request.   
Duvendack, M.                         DEV Working Paper 24 
 
43 
 
zero, for all outcome variables across all sub-groups and data collection rounds if 
selection on unobservables could be controlled for.  
 
Further questions are raised about the ability of these methods to control for 
unobservables with these data because the USAID panel data set is not a ‘true’ panel. 
It does not allow a before and after comparison; what is being compared is the 
change in the outcome variable between a group that was already a member of 
SEWA Bank in round 1 and a control group surveyed at the same time, with both 
groups at a later date. While compared to a proper before and after comparison this 
may underestimate the total impact assuming the two groups are indeed 
comparable, it at the same time reduces the possibility of controlling for 
unobservables because any differences between the participants and controls in the 
absence (before) SEWA Bank cannot be empirically observed in these data. It cannot 
be shown that the treatment group before treatment was indistinguishable in terms 
of outcome variables, or, of course, unobservables, from the control group because 
there are no data from before treatment. Further doubts are raised by the way in 
which treatment and controls were sampled.  This failed to explicitly rule out bias 
because the method of sampling of controls is not reported sufficiently. Indeed, the 
description of the procedure lays open a strong possibility that control households 
may have less ability to benefit from SEWA Bank than participating households 
because they had that opportunity but either chose not to participate or were selected 
out by self, peers or SEWA Bank staff.  
 
The collection of the new cross-section data has been of limited help since their 
results were rather inconclusive and yielded little explanatory power mainly due to 
the shortcomings of the data pointed out earlier in this paper. However, the effort to 
collect a new wave of data was highly instructive, including giving insights into 
current selection processes, which were likely to have been operative to some degree 
in the past.  
 
Based on the findings in this paper, it can be argued that a selection or screening 
process could be at work which is driven by the unobservables, e.g. entrepreneurial 
drive, business skills, possibly social capital, which together affect microfinance 
participation and cross section and (not true) panel differences between the 
treatment and control groups. The qualitative results presented here indicate a strong 
presence of social capital influencing (as outlined in Box 1) participation but the 
quantitative results cannot confirm this view due to a lack of adequate data. This 
leads to the question of how well social capital can be measured in the first place; this 
is a topic that the World Bank extensively dealt with from the mid 1990s onwards 
and measurement tools such as the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) were 
developed (Grootaert and Bastelaer, 2002). Those tools, however, are mostly too 
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general to yield any useful data, as found in this study. This is perhaps not very 
surprising; the concept of social capital is rather fuzzy (Harriss and de Renzio, 1997; 
Molyneux, 2002), and hence difficult to measure.  
 
The debate on the appropriateness of the evaluation methods currently used to 
account for selection bias is far from over; but it is clear there is no miracle cure. The 
discussion in this paper demonstrates that the evaluation techniques currently 
available have drawbacks in one way or another. PSM is not the wondrous tool as 
advocated by many and the impact estimates presented in this paper should be taken 
with appropriate qualifications. There is qualitative evidence that there are strong 
unobservable effects, and that the unobservables have not been accounted for by any 
of the econometric techniques employed. Thus, controlling for biases due to 
unobservable characteristics remains a major challenge and a clear-cut solution to 
this issue has not yet been found. One point is clear, however, it is recommended to 
complement strictly quantitative approaches with qualitative ones. 
 
Finally, not only do these data and methods not provide support for the idea that 
microfinance is highly beneficial to the poor, rather than perhaps benefitting a 
slightly better off group, but it leaves open whether microfinance is of any real 
benefit at all, since much of the apparent difference between microfinance 
participants and controls is likely due to differences in their characteristics rather 
than the intervention per se, not withstanding “inspiring stories” (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch, 2005, p. 199). This raises the question of under what 
circumstances, and for whom microfinance has been, and could be of real rather than 
imagined benefit to the poor. 
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